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AximO LAW REviaw
METHODOLOGICAL OPTIONS
FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
CONTROL OF TERRORISM
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*
T HE TITLE OF MY PRESENTATION differs from the general title of
this Conference which misleadingly links terrorism and the Middle
East. Unintended inferences will inevitably be drawn from that title.
This can only be deplored in light of the serious efforts of those
concerned scholars who are seeking rational solutions to the complex
problem of "terror-violence."
Social and behaviorial scientists will in time tell us more about the
conditions, reasons, causes and motivations leading to "terror-violence."
With such knowledge jurists will be better equipped to develop the type of
legal controls most likely to reduce the impact of violent strategies.
However, any scheme for the legal regulation and control of types of
behavior cannot be framed without a value-oriented goal. I shall not
elaborate on this point, but it is nonetheless my position that no regulatory
scheme can rest on a repressive basis because of the conflicting values
reflected in the very activity sought to be regulated and controlled. Indeed,
what is terrorism to some is heroism to others.' An international regulatory
scheme must therefore be in a position to mediate between conflicting
values and claims, and therefore, it must, as much as possible, remain
neutral in respect to competing values and claims. To whatever degree a
regulatory scheme embodies certain values, they must be clearly identified
to avoid any ambiguity. This is significant at the level of interpretation
and implementation. The value-oriented goal which serves as the premise
of my discussion is the attempt to minimize violence, to prevent its
spill-over effects to uninvolved participants and to limit its arenas. In
other words, our goal is (1) to reduce the impact of violence; (2) restrict
its extension to potential victims, and (3) prevent its exportation to
arenas beyond those wherein a given conflict exists.
With this in mind, the threshold questions are: whether to define
certain manifestations of "terror-violence," and how to regulate them
(i.e., from a substantive or complementary legal aspect). Put another
way, we may frame the issue as whether to define terrorism as an
international crime establishing an international enforcement machinery,
or to not define it but to require states to increase their collaboration in
the fields of extradition and other forms of judicial cooperation in respect
*L.L.B., Cairo University; J.D., Indiana University, Indianapolis; L.L.M., John
Marshall University; S.J.D., George Washington University; Professor of Law, DePaul
University College of Law.
'See Symposium on International Control of Terrorism, The Globe, Vol. 11-1 (1973).
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to certain activities. Assuming the choice is substantive control, the ques-
tion then becomes how to define "terrorism." The problems in defining
aggression are analogous to those of defining "terrorism."' 2 Transcending
the significant idealogical implications in the elaboration of any definition,
the methodology by which it is arrived at deserves consideration.
In this context there are three methodological options: First, the
elaboration of a general (generic) definition. Second, the selection of cer-
tain specific acts which are phrased in a manner stating the specific content
of the behavior sought to be proscribed; and finally, a mixed formula
which combines a general (generic) statement and some illustrative appli-
cations phrased with specificity of content as to the proscribed conduct.
Considering that all legal systems of the world require that certain
drafting principles be met, it is important then to ascertain these principles
which are often referred to as principles of legality.3 Furthermore, to
insure the proper application of these principles, the doctrine of analogy
in interpreting penal statutes is prohibited, and penal proscriptions must
be construed narrowly and in accordance with the plain and common
meaning of the language used. This is indispensable in order to provide
notice of the prohibited conduct and thereby afford opportunity for
compliance with the legal mandate. Thus, in view of these principles, it
appears that the first and third options would not satisfy all these
requirements and that only the second option, namely, description of
specific acts with a well-defined content, could meet such standards.
A casual survey of acts deemed terroristic, according to the literature
on the subject, would tend to indicate that these acts fall within the
categories of common crimes which are prohibited in every penal legisla-
tion of the world. Indeed, there is so much agreement on such crimes as
homicide, kidnaping, theft, robbery and extortion, that one can raise the
issue of whether it is at all necessary to elaborate a new international
crime which would encompass such conduct. The answer, however, lies
in the questions of enforcement and jurisdiction rather than in regard to
the substantive content of those specific crimes enumerated above.
The very fact that murder or kidnaping is deemed criminal in all
legal systems is not sufficient to make it an international crime. To become
so, at least one of the following five elements must be present in addition
to those of the common crime: (1) The act or series of acts takes place
in more than one state; (2) The act or series of acts takes place wherein
no state has exclusive national jurisdiction; (3) The acts affect citizens of
more than one state; (4) The acts affect internationally protected persons
(i.e., diplomats, personnel of international organization), and (5) The
2 Bassiouni, A Definition of Aggression in International Law in M. C. BASSIOUNI &
V. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 159 (1973); see also,
Hazard, Why Try Again To Define Aggression? 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 702 (1968).
3 E.g., ex post facto, nulla poena sine legge, nullen crima sine legge, BASSIOUNI,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 37 (1969).
389
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acts affect internationally protected objects such as international civil
aviation and international means of communications. 4 Thus, whenever
any one of these five elements exists in conjunction with a common
crime, it can become an international crime in addition to being a
municipal crime wherever it occurred. Such a theory must nonetheless be
codified or be the subject of a multilateral treaty. In such a case a
definition of the specific acts sought to be internationally proscribed must
be clearly set forth showing the elements of the common crime as well as
the international elements which render it internationally cognizable.
Assuming all -these requirements for international codification are
met, one cannot underestimate the difficulties involved in any attempt to
achieve that very codification of international crimes. The history of such
efforts as the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankinds attest thereto. However, if one is encouraged by the somewhat
successful treaty-making efforts in the prohibition of slavery,6 international
traffic in narcotics 7 and hijacking,8 it is nonetheless clear that no agreement
can be reached regarding penalties. Such efforts in the 1971 Montreal
Convention on Hijacking 9 have not proven successful, and the 1972
Amending Protocol to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 0
took the approach of merely requiring signatory states to impose
appropriate penalties.
Finally, the problems of enforcement and implementation which
have generally plagued the progress of international law are particularly
visible in this area. That is why the 1937 Convention on Terrorism saw
fit to prescribe the establishment of a criminal court." Since then the idea
has been recommended from time to time, and the United Nations
elaborated two drafts in 1951 and 1953 for the creation of an international
criminal court.u There are, however, no additional signs of acceptance of
4 This is generally the position taken by the III International Symposium on Terrorism
and Political Crimes of the International Institute for Advanced Criminal Sciences,
June 1973, and the proceedings will be part of a forthcoming book edited by this
writer under the title, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLrICAL CRIMES (1974).
59 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9 at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
6 See Nanda and Bassiouni, Slavery and the Slave Trade: Steps Toward Eradication,
12 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 424 (1972).
7 Bassiouni, The International Narcotics Control System, A Proposal, 46 ST. JOHNS
L. REv. 713 (1972).
8 See Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on board Aircraft,
signed at Tokyo Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. 6768; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. 7192; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971, T.I.A.S. 7570.
91d.
10 Draft Convention for Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International
Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L. 850 (1972).
11 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, opened for signatures
at Geneva, Nov. 16, 1937, 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 23 (1938).
12 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 12 at 18, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950); 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. 12
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the idea save for the writings of scholars defending it.13
The contemporary approach seems to avoid the issue of an inter-
national enforcement mechanism, and consequently the trend is moving
away from the elaboration of a general treaty defining an international
crime of terrorism.'4 The direction seems to be the one adopted in the
1970 Hague Convention on Hijacking and 1972 Amending Protocol on
Narcotics, which is designed to impose upon states the duty to prosecute
under municipal law or to extradite. Thus, the methodological choice
appears to steer away from substantive international criminal law to
adjective (complementary) international criminal law. This trend is
highlighted by the 1972 United States Proposed Draft Convention on
Terrorism which embodies the value-oriented goals stated earlier in this
presentation, namely the minimization of violence, its restriction to
participants in a given conflict, and its limitation to the arenas of these
conflicts.' 5 The 1972 Draft Convention was the product of Professor
Moore's efforts 16 whose position seems to be that an international
regulatory scheme is more likely to be accepted and succeed if it avoids
the idealogical implications of the conflicting values which are usually
at the very base of terror-violence strategies. The United States proposal
illustrates the fact that no international superstructure is contemplated,
but instead that increased judicial cooperation is the desirable option to
effectively control the problem.
The duty to prosecute or extradite is well established in international
criminal law and has its origin in a maxim by Hugo Grotius, namely,
aut dedere aut punire. This speaker suggests that a more appropriate
maxim is maseim is aut dedere aut iudicare. It appears to me that the
future may well see two stages of development. The first one will be in
the field of adjective international criminal law,'17 and the second state
of substantive international control may only come into being after the
at 23, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954). See also, United Nations Secretariat, Historical
Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7
at 18 (1949).
13 See Doutricourt, The International Criminal Court in M. C. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA,
I A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 636 (1973) and L. Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski,
The Creation of an International Criminal Court for the Suppression of International
Terrorism in BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLrrICAL CRIMES (1974).
14 See Study prepared by the United Nations Secretariat entitled, Measures to prevent
international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes
fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism
and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which
cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to
effect radical changes, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418 (1972).
15 See Draft Convention on International Terrorism, supra, note 10.
16 John Norton Moore, Professor of Law, University of Virginia, was counselor in
International Law in the Department of State, 1972, and prepared this draft in that
capacity.
17 On the topic of judicial cooperation in extradition, see e.g., M. C. BAsSIous' & V.
NANDA, II A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1973).
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first one has been successful in the course of the customary practice of
states. That second stage would be the elaboration of an international
criminal code with an international supporting structure for its enforce-
ment and implementation. That stage may prove unnecessary if the first
one produces satisfactory outcomes. However, since this is not likely, the
second stage may prove necessary if a sufficient number of states deem it
in their best interest and in the interest of preserving minimum world
order to abate jealously guarded concepts of sovereignty. The exigencies
of the problems may accelerate international cooperation, particularly
if its dimensions continue to grow beyond the ability of existing or
contemplated schemes to control it.
From this speaker's perspective, the strategies of "terror-violence"
throughout the world are not likely to abate but on the contrary are
certain to increase. The reason for this prediction is based on three
factors. (1) Conventional wars appear to have outlived their historical
usefulness. (2) Nuclear strategy has not developed to a point where it can
be a useful instrument in attaining power outcomes. (3) There are no
conflict resolution devices available for the settlement of disputes arising
out of idealogical claims and human rights violations. Nevertheless, we
must not be as indiscriminate as we have been with respect to considering
all forms of "terror-violence" as terroristic strategies requiring interna-
tional controls. There are three distinctions which must be made and which
arise out of common experience with the various manifestations of "terror-
violence." These distinctions must be based on the motivations of the
perpetrators of such acts. Namely, are we dealing with psychopathological
cases which so far have produced the majority of hijackings; common
criminals or persons acting for personal or private profit-motive as in
some hijacking cases and kidnapping, or idealogically motivated persons
who are part of national liberation movements or internal political
opposition movements? Certainly as to participants in national liberation
movements, the regulation of armed conflicts and the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions regulate such conduct, 8 and the only weakness is the lack of
enforcement machinery. As to other forms of idealogically motivated
"terror-violence," the ability to control that violence will be only as
successful as alternative conflict resolution devices are found to channel
such conflicts into a peaceful arena. The present situation leaves no
alternative but a resort to "terror-violence" to accomplish what is
sometimes a legitimate end based on legitimate rights, but which find
no legal or peaceful remedy for their redress.
It must also be stated that not all forms of idealogically declared
"terror-violence" are to benefit from the mitigation, if not justification,
advanced earlier. Some criteria must be set forth to distinguish between
Is For the regulation of armed conflict see M. C. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, I A TREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, Part 3, 295-454 1973); Yingling & Ginnane, The Geneva
Convention of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 393 (1952).
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legitimate resort to violence and its permissible limits as a last resort and
"terror-violence" whose only connection to a legitimizing reason is the
self-proclaimed rhetoric of its perpetrators. This will be of great impor-
tance to determine whether extradition is to be granted or whether the
accused can benefit from the political offense exceptions. 19
We must also be mindful that efforts to regulate and control
"terror-violence" cannot merely be only one-sided. All too often the same
behavior, or behavior similar in nature or outcome is proscribed for
some, and accepted when committed by others. The "terror-violence" of
colonization cannot be condoned while the "terror-violence" of liberation
is condemned. Similarly, kidnaping 20 and hijacking 2' cannot be deemed
a crime when committed by individuals and permissible when committed
by agents of a state.
In conclusion, allow me to state that however abhorrent all forms of
violence are, the "terrorism" we know today is probably the beginning
of a new historical cycle. If such acts of violence are to replace wars,
whether conventional or in any other form, then "terrorism" is welcome
because its harmful consequences are minimal in comparison to the well
known consequences of war. A single bombing raid in World War II or
Viet Nam caused more damage, harm, and destruction than all the
consequences of "terrorism" during the last quarter of the century. This
is true even if the random and haphazard nature of contemporary
"terror-violence" can be distinguished from the better aspects of regulated
conventional warfare. This is not a glorification of "terror-violence," nor
for that matter even an apology for it, but a mere observation which
reflects on the nature of our civilization. Indeed, terrorism is nothing more
than a manifestation of the quality of our civilization and its elimination
is a function of the thickening of its thin veneer.
22
DISCUSSION
The question put to Professor Bassiouni concerned itself with
whether there should be a regional, domestic, or universal basis
for international law on settling the problem of terrorism.
I must say I had grave reservations in my earlier discussions with the
19 Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offense Exception in
Extradition, A Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem, 19 DEPAUL L.
REv. 217 (1970).
20oBassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alternatives to
Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 25 (1973), discussing various forms of unlawful
seizures by states of persons outside their jurisdiction. E.g., cases of Eichmann,
Tsombe, Soblen, Argoud, Ahlers, and 11 Arabs seized by Israel in Lebanon in 1973
and brought to trial. Id. at 28-33.
21 As an example, the unlawful seizure in Lebanese air space of an Iraqi Airways
plane by Israeli military aircraft, forcing it to land in Israel. See Time, August 20,
1973, at 28.
22 Bassiouni, The Human Rights Program-The Veneer of Civilization Thickens, 21
DEPAux. L. Rzv. 271 (1971).
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organizers about this topic. I would like to call your attention to the fact
that the Palestinian Liberation Organization is an organization dedicated
to liberate its national homeland which had been seized by force against
the will of the local population which had been evicted. In the process of
that eviction of the Palestinians from their homeland, many terroristic
actions have taken place to prevent such ouster. If we are to indeed look
at international law as neutral, we cannot under any stretch of the imagi-
nation accept that Israeli terror is legitimate and Palestinian terror is
criminal. Otherwise we run into what Mr. Dayan once called "the making
of facts" whereby one party creates a fact, and the acceptance of the
status quo is condoned by international law without any means of redress
for the claimant who then finds himself in the position of having to engage
in acts which the world community subsequently labels as terroristic.
There is no question in my mind that if we are going to try to find a
solution for acts of violence, and there are indeed acts of violence which
legitimately fall into any definition of "terrorism," we must single out
those common crimes which have an international character. We have no
difficulty in finding that an individual who hijacked an aircraft for
purposes of ransom, engages in such a crime. Clearly, individuals who
engage in the kidnaping of industrial persons or diplomats, for purposes
of economic extortion or other personal gains, commit a crime. However,
when we enter into the field of self-determination and wars of national
liberation, the question becomes more difficult. This is because we are
dealing with the state, with all the powers appurtenant to states, and the
recognition that a state has in international law, whereas an individual or
group does not have that recognition nor the right to resort to violence
as has a state. The limitations imposed upon individuals by the very
nature of the situation compels them to engage in some action which is
bound to be at times outside the scope of the law, unless the law devises
certain structures for redress of wrongs. There is at this point in time no
international system by which wrongs can be redressed. There is no means
through which the international community can indeed restore the rights
of those individuals whose human rights have been violated. Consequently,
what is the outcome? Now the simplistic solution is to condemn any form
of coercion that such individuals may engage in, and through repression
evade the real issues. Shouldn't we instead try to devise means of
preventing the need to resort to such action?
With respect to human rights, I think that we can devise regional and
international structures to implement these rights at the national level.
Similarly, we can control international crimes such as "terrorism" at the
international, regional and national level. This will depend upon what is
classified as terroristic actions. It seems rather easy to deal with the
psychopathological and the common criminal who engages in an action
that has international ramifications, but it is more difficult to deal with
claims of self-determination and wars of national liberation. Now it is not
[Vol. 7:3
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true, however, that there are no international laws that restrict forms
of violence between combatants. Accordingly, I call the attention of
Mr. Paust to the Four IGUG Geneva Conventions, particularly with
respect to the treatment of prisoners of war, the sick, and the wounded. I
find it difficult to answer the above question dispassionately. Nevertheless,
I would suggest in the first place that we deal with the question of
what are the common crimes of international character that should be
controlled. Those it seems to me can be defined by international treaties,
and universal jurisdiction can be established along with an obligation
to extradite or prosecute, thus leaving every nation with the duty to
either prosecute or extradite. This eliminates the need to create a
cumbersome international structure, such as an international criminal
court or an international criminal police.
With respect to wars of national liberation and the conflicts on
self-determination, the problem is much more complex than that, and I
don't think that we are going to be able by any stretch of the imagination
to devise any means of controlling terror-violence arising in this context
so long as the initial claims of the participants do not find a channel
through which they can legitimately assert their claims in a peaceful
way. There are, however, some imaginative alternatives. For example, if
a given group would like to make known its claim, I see no reason why
we cannot set up an international radio-television station where liberation
movements could have access and broadcast their claims to the world
community, avoiding 'the need 'to focus attention on them by engaging in
particular acts which are dramatic in the eyes of the press. On the other
hand, it seems to me we have enough international law at our disposal to
be 'able to adjudicate certain claims and therefore a more expanded role
for the International Court of Justice should be contemplated.
It is difficult to determine what is aggression and also what is
self-determination, but certainly if we are going to try to apply both
concepts to the Middle East conflict as it is generally called, I would
rather call it the Arab-Israeli conflict, and more specifically the Palestinian
conflict where we're dealing with their self-determination claims. The
United Nations has recognized their claim, but their rights have not been
enforced. Where do they go from there? You can certainly suppress their
claims, and say that is the end of the route for them, that they should not
engage in any further actions to make any such claims valid. Certainly,
you have to realize that the strategy they employ is going to be limited by
their money and resources. They have no nations from which to operate,
they have no real basis of operation, and they have no army to declare a
defensive war which would render their action legitimate. Therefore, they
have to engage in actions which would seem otherwise abhorrent. These
actions can be repressed as their rights or their actions can be prevented,
by redressing these wrongs and granting them legitimate claims.
How do you classify the terrorists? Particularly if you wish to call
8
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them that, and I think that's debatable to say the least. What is the point
of view to be taken with respect to them? Is there toleration by the govern-
ments or are they considered a legitimate arm of a national movement?
I think we are going to have to distinguish between Arab govern-
ments, in terms of their position, as to this particular issue. Some
governments, of course, recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization
as being the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and they
recognize that the activities they engage in are valid activities by the Black
September Group or activities which are conducted by other splinter
groups. I do not know of any Arab government that has condoned or
recognized the validity of the acts of the Japanese in Lod airport. I think
these are easily distinguishable acts. On the other hand this is a very
difficult situation because it involves internal political considerations on
the part of the Arab states. Each Arab government is going to have to
deal with its own constituency and with its position vis-i-vis the entire
conflict. It is true that many of the actions engaged in by the Palestinians
are intended to dramatize their plight, to cause the Arab governments to
take a stronger position, and to force the issue into the open.
In Security Council resolution 242 of 1967, which is supposed to be
the basis of a settlement in -the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinians are
referred to therein as the "refugee problem." However, by 1969, the United
Nations recognized the "legitimate rights of the people of Palestine to
self-determination." Consequently you see a shift between 1967 and 1969
from "refugees" to "people." Now that does mean that the international
community puts a premium on such action because without it, the
international community did not recognize the Palestinians as a conflict
for nationhood but saw it only as problems of refugees. This again shows
the precarious nature of international law at this point in time where
without coercion there is no recognition of legitimate claims. Now
obviously, as jurists, I 'think we have to rely on the neutrality of law, and
its equitable application to all world community participants regardless
of whether they are states, groups or individuals.
[Vol. 7:3
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